At the recent Tucson Meet Yourself annual gathering, October 2007
He stood there for hours into the night, making sure that as we ate good food, we did not forget about human rights.
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Thursday, November 22, 2007
"Free Speech Needed Most When It's Wanted Least"
He stood there for hours into the night, making sure that as we ate good food, we did not forget about human rights.
Monday, November 05, 2007
More on military, anthropologists, and plagiarism
Last week, we noted the expose of anthropologist David Price on possible instances of plagiarism in the U.S.Army/ Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (COIN), which was recently published by the University of Chicago Press.
The listed author, Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, a West Point graduate, Rhodes Scholar, with a PhD from Oxford, has responded to Dr. Price. His article, “Desperate People with Limited Skills", faults Dr. Price for his diatribe and says that adherence to academic writing standards is not applicable in a military manual. He writes;
"To paraphrase von Clausewitz, military Field Manuals have their own grammar and their own logic. They are not doctoral dissertations, designed to be read by few and judged largely for the quality of their sourcing; instead, they are intended for use by soldiers. Thus authors are not named, and those whose scholarship informs the manual are only credited if they are quoted extensively. This is not the academic way, but soldiers are not academics; it is my understanding that this longstanding practice in doctrine writing is well within the provisions of “fair use” copyright law."
Dr. Price immediately rebutted Lt. Col. Nagl's articl and U.S. Army spokesman Major Tom McCuin's assertion that they made several offers to anthropologists to discuss these issues. In his rebuttal Dr. Price stuck to his point that the COIN manual is being represented as an academic book by its author and the ghost writers who are anthropologists. Worse, he noted that the publication was made to deflect discussions from the Iraq debacle. He concludes with;
"If the Counterinsurgency Field Manual had remained an obscure military document, I can't imagine this exchange would be occurring. It was the Army's calculated decision to use the University of Chicago Press to try and sell the American public the notion that we could win the Iraq War based on intellectual principles, rather than shock and awe that raised the ante on claims of academic worth. If there are public claims that the Manual is a work of scholars, then the scholarship of this work needs examination, and this is precisely what my article does."
The controversy reminds me of the Tasaday Hoax in the Philippines, where an alleged stone-age group was discovered. Anthropologists and scholars immediately debunked this claim and cited the motivations of the Marcos regime to deflect criticism from his martial law regime and to control the resource competition for mining claims among his cronies. Scholars and writers who staked their academic reputation on the Tasadays-as-real were just as determined to prove it so. The saga has tarnished the reputation of anthropologists and has brought suffering to these manipulated indigenous people's group.
Back to the COIN controversy. What struck me the most though was what Lt. Col. Nagl admitted:
"When insurgencies arose in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the United States Army was unprepared to fight them..."
"To paraphrase von Clausewitz, military Field Manuals have their own grammar and their own logic. They are not doctoral dissertations, designed to be read by few and judged largely for the quality of their sourcing; instead, they are intended for use by soldiers. Thus authors are not named, and those whose scholarship informs the manual are only credited if they are quoted extensively. This is not the academic way, but soldiers are not academics; it is my understanding that this longstanding practice in doctrine writing is well within the provisions of “fair use” copyright law."
Dr. Price immediately rebutted Lt. Col. Nagl's articl and U.S. Army spokesman Major Tom McCuin's assertion that they made several offers to anthropologists to discuss these issues. In his rebuttal Dr. Price stuck to his point that the COIN manual is being represented as an academic book by its author and the ghost writers who are anthropologists. Worse, he noted that the publication was made to deflect discussions from the Iraq debacle. He concludes with;
"If the Counterinsurgency Field Manual had remained an obscure military document, I can't imagine this exchange would be occurring. It was the Army's calculated decision to use the University of Chicago Press to try and sell the American public the notion that we could win the Iraq War based on intellectual principles, rather than shock and awe that raised the ante on claims of academic worth. If there are public claims that the Manual is a work of scholars, then the scholarship of this work needs examination, and this is precisely what my article does."
The controversy reminds me of the Tasaday Hoax in the Philippines, where an alleged stone-age group was discovered. Anthropologists and scholars immediately debunked this claim and cited the motivations of the Marcos regime to deflect criticism from his martial law regime and to control the resource competition for mining claims among his cronies. Scholars and writers who staked their academic reputation on the Tasadays-as-real were just as determined to prove it so. The saga has tarnished the reputation of anthropologists and has brought suffering to these manipulated indigenous people's group.
Back to the COIN controversy. What struck me the most though was what Lt. Col. Nagl admitted:
"When insurgencies arose in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the United States Army was unprepared to fight them..."
Friday, October 12, 2007
Marshall Sahlins and more on Anthropologists go to war
Marshall Sahlins addresses the call for a more updated discussion on anthropologists and Iraq/Afghanistan in his letter to NYT. See the link below, which was forwarded to the e-anth listserve.
The incident he was talking about can be found here: U.S. Guards Kill 2 Iraqi Women in New Shooting - New York Times
(an open letter to the New York Times)
To the Editor:
The report (Oct.11) of the killing of two Iraqi women by hired guns of the State Department whose mission was “to improve local government and democratic institutions” bears an interesting relation to the story of a few days earlier about the collaboration of anthropologists in just such imperious interventions in other peoples’ existence in the interest of extending American power around the world. It seems only pathetic that some anthropologists would criticize their colleagues’ participation in such adventures on grounds of their own disciplinary self-interest, complaining that now they will not be able to do fieldwork because the local people will suspect them of being spies. What about the victims of these militarily-backed intrusions, designed to prescribe how others should organize their lives at the constant risk of losing them? What is as incredible as it is reprehensible is that anthropologists should be engaged in such projects of cultural domination, that is, as willing collaborators in the forceful imposition of American values and governmental forms on people who have long known how to maintain and cherish their own ways of life.
Of course, these collaborating anthropologists have the sense that they are doing good and being good. I am reminded of a cartoon I saw years ago, I think it was in the Saturday Review of Literature, which shows two hooded executioners leaning on their long-handled axes, and one says to the other: “The way I see it, if I didn’t do this, some sonovabitch would get the job.”
Marshall Sahlins
______
My last comment is this:
Let us again remind ourselves of the consequences of the
US SPENDING IN
- Cost of deploying one
- Lost & Unaccounted for in
- per ABC News, 190,000 guns, including 110,000 AK-47 rifles.
- Mismanaged & Wasted in
- Number of major
TROOPS IN
- Iraqi Troops Trained and Able to Function Independent of
- Troops in
- US Troop Casualities - 3,800
- Non-US Troop Casualties - Total 300, with 169 from the
- US Troops Wounded - 27,936, 20% of which are serious brain or spinal injuries (total excludes psychological injuries)
- US Troops with Serious Mental Health Problems 30% of
IRAQI TROOPS, CIVILIANS & OTHERS IN
- Private Contractors in
- Journalists killed - 112, 74 by murder and 38 by acts of war
- Journalists killed by US Forces - 14
- Iraqi Police and Soldiers Killed - 7,460
- Iraqi Civilians Killed, Estimated - A UN issued report dated Sept 20, 2006 stating that Iraqi civilian casualties have been significantly under-reported. Casualties are reported at 50,000 to over 100,000, but may be much higher. Some informed estimates place Iraqi civilian casualties at over 600,000.
- Iraqi Insurgents Killed, Roughly Estimated - 55,000
- Non-Iraqi Contractors and Civilian Workers Killed - 539
- Non-Iraqi Kidnapped - 305, including 54 killed, 147 released, 4 escaped, 6 rescued and 94 status unknown.
- Daily Insurgent Attacks, Feb 2004 - 14
- Daily Insurgent Attacks, July 2005 - 70
- Daily Insurgent Attacks, May 2007 - 163
- Estimated Insurgency Strength, Nov 2003 - 15,000
- Estimated Insurgency Strength, Oct 2006 - 20,000 - 30,000
- Estimated Insurgency Strength, June 2007 - 70,000
QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS
- Iraqis Displaced Inside
- Iraqi Refugees in
- Iraqi Unemployment Rate - 27 to 60%, where curfew not in effect
- Consumer Price Inflation in 2006 - 50%
- Iraqi Children Suffering from Chronic Malnutrition - 28% in June 2007 (Per CNN.com, July 30, 2007)
- Percent of professionals who have left
- Iraqi Physicians Before 2003 Invasion - 34,000
- Iraqi Physicians Who Have Left
- Iraqi Physicians Murdered Since 2003 Invasion - 2,000
- Average Daily Hours Iraqi Homes Have Electricity - 1 to 2 hours, per Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to
- Average Daily Hours Iraqi Homes Have Electricity - 10.9 in May 2007
- Average Daily Hours Baghdad Homes Have Electricity - 5.6 in May 2007
- Pre-War Daily Hours Baghdad Homes Have Electricity - 16 to 24
- Number of Iraqi Homes Connected to Sewer Systems - 37%
- Iraqis without access to adequate water supplies - 70% (Per CNN.com, July 30, 2007)
- Water Treatment Plants Rehabilitated - 22%
RESULTS OF POLL Taken in
- Iraqis "strongly opposed to presence of coalition troops - 82%
- Iraqis who believe Coalition forces are responsible for any improvement in security - less than 1%
- Iraqis who feel less secure because of the occupation - 67%
- Iraqis who do not have confidence in multi-national forces - 72%
Other sources:
Iraq War Results & Statistics as of Sept 23, 2007,
Iraq War Casualties - FCNL Issues
Brookings Institute’s Most Recent Iraq Index PDF
Anthropologists working for the military imply engagement with the military as an institution. The operative word is engagement. In this context, one end goal of the anthropologist should be to influence policy, vision, goals, and objectives of the institution. Are anthropologists really in a position to do so?
What aspect of the statistics shown above are they working on and hoping to achieve? What part of it includes studying culture, society, and humanity without compromising the interests of your subjects?
Are they really doing applied anthropology? Or are they using applied anthropology methods and perspectives in counter-insurgency operations? Someone noted to me that in a free country, anyone including anthropologists, can express their opinion and choose their employer. That is correct, but semantically, are they applied anthropologists or just counter-insurgency specialists or even- soldiers? Let us get our semantics right.
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
Anthropologists go to war
Recent news reports relayed the experience and perspective of anthropologists working with
A point of clarification though is the use of the term WAR. Do the terms 'war in Iraq Iraq at war', or even 'anthropologists at war' presuppose that there is war in Iraq Iraq primarily and not Afghanistan
Isn't it more of an occupation by a few countries, primarily by one country, ofIraq
As you all know, if you look at the rationale for invadingIraq
Historically, the role of anthropologists working with governments in times of conflict, particulary the U.S. government or military (Southeast Asia) or the British colonial authorities, has been critized for its moral contradictions, contributions to furthering imperialist (anthropology, the handmaiden of colonialism), geopolitical, and even now neoconservative agendas, and further oppression of indigenous populations.
Now you can criticize me for being too general and you can cite individual contributions or local instances of good works by embedded anthropologists.
Fine, but we go back to the primary question:
If there was no war, invasion, or occupation, would there be a need for anthropologists embedded in the military?
Anthropologists working for the military imply engagement with the military as an institution. The operative word is engagement. The end goal of the anthropologist should be to influence policy, vision, goals, objectives of the institution. Are anthropologist really in a position to do so?
On the other hand, if you are for the war/occupation, say so, and go help the military and accept the consequences of your actions.
If you are against the war/occupation, then your work as an anthropologist should be towards ending it, not rationalizing or making warfare "more human" or even anthropologizing the military. A more human war is an oxymoron term.
My last point is this. As some of my cohort/batchmates like to remind one another, these are historical times. Prior to the Nov. 2006 U.S. Congressional elections when Democrats regained Congress, there were several instances when anthropologists among many other disciplines should have stood up and spoken against the Iraq invasion, the attacks on scientific integrity, the cooptation of regulatory agencies, the increased social exclusion and income inequality, the distortions of the immigration issue, Katrina, even the 2004 AAA fiasco, etc. Many did speak up and acted, but many more did not. The silence was deafening.
By 2008, there will probably be a Democrat President and it will be easier to speak up against what is morally wrong. But don't you think it was better to have spoken during the 'dark' times rather than when it is safe to do so?
****************************************
Isn't it more of an occupation by a few countries, primarily by one country, of
As you all know, if you look at the rationale for invading
Historically, the role of anthropologists working with governments in times of conflict, particulary the U.S. government or military (Southeast Asia) or the British colonial authorities, has been critized for its moral contradictions, contributions to furthering imperialist (anthropology, the handmaiden of colonialism), geopolitical, and even now neoconservative agendas, and further oppression of indigenous populations.
Now you can criticize me for being too general and you can cite individual contributions or local instances of good works by embedded anthropologists.
Fine, but we go back to the primary question:
If there was no war, invasion, or occupation, would there be a need for anthropologists embedded in the military?
Anthropologists working for the military imply engagement with the military as an institution. The operative word is engagement. The end goal of the anthropologist should be to influence policy, vision, goals, objectives of the institution. Are anthropologist really in a position to do so?
On the other hand, if you are for the war/occupation, say so, and go help the military and accept the consequences of your actions.
If you are against the war/occupation, then your work as an anthropologist should be towards ending it, not rationalizing or making warfare "more human" or even anthropologizing the military. A more human war is an oxymoron term.
My last point is this. As some of my cohort/batchmates like to remind one another, these are historical times. Prior to the Nov. 2006 U.S. Congressional elections when Democrats regained Congress, there were several instances when anthropologists among many other disciplines should have stood up and spoken against the Iraq invasion, the attacks on scientific integrity, the cooptation of regulatory agencies, the increased social exclusion and income inequality, the distortions of the immigration issue, Katrina, even the 2004 AAA fiasco, etc. Many did speak up and acted, but many more did not. The silence was deafening.
By 2008, there will probably be a Democrat President and it will be easier to speak up against what is morally wrong. But don't you think it was better to have spoken during the 'dark' times rather than when it is safe to do so?
****************************************
From the Network of Concerned Anthropologists
Roberto J. González (2007). "We Must Fight the Militarization of Anthropology." Chronicle of Higher Education, February 2. (Download at gonzalez-militarization.doc.)
Sharon Weinberger (2007). "When Anthropologists Go To War (Against the Military)." Danger Room-Wired Blog, September 19. (Access at http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/09/when-anthropolo.html.)
Scott Peterson (2007). "US Army's Strategy in
Roberto J. González and David H. Price (2007). "When Anthropologists Become Counter-Insurgents." CounterPunch, September 28. (Access at http://counterpunch.org/gonzalez09272007.html.)
Hugh Gusterson and David Price (2005). "Spies in Our Midst." Anthropology News, September. (Access at http://www.aaanet.org/press/an/infocus/prisp/gusterson.htm.)
Roberto J. González (2007). "Towards Mercenary Anthropology? US Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 and the Military-Anthropology Complex." (Access at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/anth/23/3.)
Kilcullen, David (2007). "Ethics, Politics, and Non-State Warfare: A Response to González." Anthropology Today vol. 23, no. 3. (Access at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/anth/23/3.)
McFate,
David Glenn (2007). "Petitioners Urge Anthropologists to Stop Working with Pentagon in
Boas, Franz (1919). "Scientists as Spies." The Nation, October 16. Reprinted in Roberto J. González, ed. (2004) Anthropologists in the Public Sphere, pp. 23-25 .
David H. Price (2004). "'Like Slaves': Anthropological Notes on Occupation." CounterPunch, January 6. (Access at http://www.counterpunch.org/price01062004.html.)
David H. Price (2002). "Present Dangers, Past Wars, Future Anthropologies." Anthropology Today 18(1). (Access at http://homepages.stmartin.edu/fac_staff/dprice/price-at1.pdf.)
David H. Price (2007). "Anthropology and the Wages of Secrecy." Anthropology News, March. (Access at http://www.anthrosource.net/doi/abs/10.1525/an.2007.48.3.6.)
David H. Price (2002). "Lessons from Second World War Anthropology: Peripheral, Persuasive, and Ignored Contributions." Anthropology Todayhttp://homepages.stmartin.edu/fac_staff/dprice/price-at-6-02-WWII.pdf.) 18(3). (Access at
David H. Price (2007). "Buying a Piece of Anthropology, Part I: Human Ecology and Unwitting Anthropological Research for the CIA." Anthropology Today, vol. 23, no. 3. Access at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/anth/23/3
David H. Price (2007). "Buying a Piece of Anthropology, Part II: The CIA and Our Tortured Past." Anthropology Today, vol. 23, no. 5. (Access at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/anth/23/5
Roberto J. González (2007). "Patai and Abu Ghraib." Anthropology Today, vol. 23, no. 5 (Access at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/anth/23/5
Scott Canon (2007). "Anthropologists Debate Ethics of Working on War Effort."
David Rohde (2007). "Army Enlists Anthropologists in War Zones." New York Times, p. A1. Access here
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
Anthropology of Relevance
Anthropology of Relevance
Recently in an egroup that I am part of that discusses environment, culture, and geopolitical issues, there was a spirited exchange on the relevance of anthropology and anthropologists in these exciting times. Wading through the verbal firestorm, I found many insights, which will help me in my current dissertation work. I would like to explore other aspects though of the ongoing conversation.
The first is that I seem to notice a collective angst on what anthropology’s status and role are at present. What is it’s contribution to the GES (global environmental sustainability) and gepolitical debates in the macro sense? Specifically, are anthropologists being read, listened to, and recognized especially by decision makers? Does their work have impact in the local and in the global settings? Should anthropologists even care if their work has impact? The angst is there because of global warming and the continuing
Might the issue have to do with scale? The GES and
My research focuses on a faith-based movement in the
Slum home in Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines
Gawad Kalinga housingTaguig, Metro Manila, Philippines
In practical terms poverty (and the resulting environmental crisis) can be addressed through sharing of time and resources, MASSIVE mobilization of partners and "padugo"- "bleeding for the cause" and modeling "patriotism in action". Since then, it has built over 20,000 homes in 1,420 communities for the poor and initiated activities in three other countries, with intentions of going global. GK claims their "transformed" communities are peace and faith zones, environmentally healthy, empowered, and productive through initiatives on shelter, youth development, health, food, livelihood, and values formation. GK claims their sites are “non-sectarian, multi-sectoral, non-partisan and non-discriminatory”. Each volunteer is a hero (bayani) to one another, which leads to community-wide assistance (bayanihan). Replicated over time sand space, bayanihan then stimulates nation (bayan) building. GK’s success resulted in the GK Executive Director/Founder and the organization winning the 2006 Ramon Magsaysay (Asian Nobel prize) awards for individual and organizational community leadership and other similar awards. They have gotten so much support from the private and public sectors that other cause oriented groups and aid agencies have been put on notice:
By the way, they are also currently recruiting another one million volunteers worldwide and establishing volunteer research institutes in any university willing to partner up with them. They are becoming viral.
The movement is anchored on faith, culture work, and partnerships. Importantly, it is massive in scale (geographically) and is transformative in intention.What can be more cultural (for research and applied work) than social engineering initiatives such as this?
The implication for anthropologists today is that social movements like Gawad Kalinga or MoveOn, social networking initiatives such as MySpace and FaceBook, faith-based movements or even the Christian Right is that their outlook is global. Their actions are cheekily in the pursuit of some form of “global domination”. Globalization is not only about commerce, but fundamentally cultural. The GES, geopolitics, and poverty are both local and global.
How do anthropology and anthropologists adapt to a shrinking and globalizing world vis-à-vis our research and our work?
To me it isn’t relevance per se. All work is relevant if you find inspiration in it. But if we want others to consider us relevant, then we have to look at reality.
And the reality is: events of concern to anthropologists are global in dimension. Our work and research must then have scientific rigor, practical application, and global insight.
P.S.
I interviewed a British-Nigerian Catholic priest working in the
“I like the way I am doing things better than the way you aren’t doing anything at all”
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